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Abstract A large number of neoclassical, behavioral, and bias-based theories try to
explain the tendency of small, value, and winner stocks to outperform big, growth,
and loser stocks, threewell-known characteristic anomalies. Because the theories often
predict similar relationships between a stock’s propensity to contribute to the anomalies
and a set of correlated firm characteristics, existing studies focusing on single theories
do not tell us which theory is most successful in explaining the anomalies. To fill
this gap, we use a new non-parametric methodology to run a horse race between the
theories. In the first step,we use statistical leverage analysis to find outwhich stocks are
ultimately responsible for the anomalies. In the second, we use the firm characteristics
suggested by the theories to forecast the identity of the anomaly drivers, with the
purpose of determining which theory is most supported by the data. We find that
behavioral theories are most convincing in explaining the size and book-to-market
anomalies, while no theory is convincing in explaining the momentum anomaly.
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1 Introduction
Prior research shows that several firm characteristics explain the cross section of stock
returns even when controlling for rational asset pricing factors, such as the market
beta. Premier among these firm characteristics are market capitalization (“size”), the
book-to-market (“BM”) ratio, and the medium-term past (“momentum”) return (Banz
1981; Rosenberg et al. 1985; Fama and French 1992; Jegadeesh and Titman 1993).
Spurred by these so-called characteristic anomalies, a large number of neoclassical,
behavioral, and bias-based theories have emerged over the last years trying to explain
the anomalies. While each theory finds some support in empirical tests exclusively
focusing on it (or on it and a restricted set of other theories), such tests do not tell us
which theory ismost consistent with the data. Also, given thatmost firm characteristics
are related, such tests do not allow us to rule out that a univariate relationship between
a stock’s propensity to contribute to an anomaly and a firm characteristic is driven by
the effect of another firm characteristic supporting another theory.
To address the above limitations, our article runs a comprehensive horse race
between the neoclassical, behavioral, and bias-based theories. To do so, we use a
new non-parametric methodology. In the first step, we apply statistical leverage analy-
sis to identify those stocks that are most responsible for the characteristic anomalies
(“anomaly drivers”). Conceptually speaking, the statistical leverage analysis looks at
the change in the strength of an anomaly when excluding arbitrary subsets of stocks
from our stock universe, and it chooses those stocks as anomaly drivers whose joint
exclusion turns the anomaly least pronounced (Belsley et al. 1980; Davidson and
MacKinnon 2004). In the second step, we use univariate and multivariate analysis to
compare the identified anomaly drivers with matched stocks not contributing to the
anomaly (“non-anomaly drivers”) across several firm characteristics. In these compar-
isons, we distinguish between anomaly drivers that would be held on the long side of a
portfolio trying to exploit the anomaly (“long anomaly drivers”) and those that would
be held on the short side (“short anomaly drivers”).1 Comparing the relationships
found in the data with those implied by the neoclassical, behavioral, and bias-based
theories, we are able to determine which theory is most successful in explaining the
characteristic anomalies.
The main advantage of our empirical design is that it allows us to determine how
much the firm characteristics suggested by one theory contribute to explaining the
characteristic anomalies—while controlling for a large set of other firm characteristics
suggested by other theories. While portfolio formation exercises also allow us to
control for other firm characteristics, it is often infeasible to go beyond three- or four-
way sorted portfolios, limiting the number of other firm characteristics that we can
control for. Including interactions betweenfirmcharacteristics and anomaly variables,2
1 The long anomaly drivers are the small, value, and winner stocks with abnormally high returns that drive
the size, BM, and momentum effects, respectively; the short anomaly drivers are the large, growth, and
loser stocks with abnormally low returns that drive the size, BM, and momentum effects, respectively.
2 The anomaly variables (size, BM, and momentum) are obviously also firm characteristics. Notwithstand-
ing, we usually refer to them as anomaly variables to distinguish them from the firm characteristics that are
able to forecast the anomaly drivers according to the neoclassical, behavioral, and bias-based theories.
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Fama–MacBeth (1973; FM) regressions allow us to control for a larger set of other
firm characteristics. However, such regressions force us to take a parametric stance
on the relationships between a stock’s propensity to contribute to an anomaly and the
firm characteristics, and it is not always clear that our stance is correct.3 Our empirical
design is able to capture the true relationship between a stock’s propensity to contribute
to an anomaly and a firm characteristic independent of how the relationship looks like.
Similar to Knez and Ready (1997), we find that only 0.10–1% of stocks are respon-
sible for the size, BM, and momentum anomalies. The long anomaly drivers often do
not have higher risk exposures than the matched non-anomaly drivers, but they tend to
be more volatile, more financially distressed, more or less liquid, and more likely to be
a penny stock. In contrast, the short anomaly drivers often have higher risk exposures,
are more volatile, are more or less followed by financial analysts, and have more or
less liquid shares.
To analyze the robustness of these relationships, we use the firm characteristics to
estimate the probability of a stock becoming a long or a short anomaly driver over the
next 12-month investment period. We calculate this probability using either the whole
sample (in-sample) or only data available until the current month (out-of-sample).
Using either set of probabilities, we show that the size and BM effects are twice as
strong among stocks predicted to be anomaly drivers than among stocks predicted to be
non-anomaly drivers.Digging deeper,wefind that it ismostly the positive relationships
between idiosyncratic volatility and distress risk, on the one hand, and the propensity
of becoming a long or short size anomaly driver, on the other, that help us to improve
on the strength of the size effect. Similarly, it is mostly a positive relationship between
idiosyncratic volatility and the propensity of becoming a long or short BM anomaly
driver that helps us to improve on the strength of the BM effect.
While some firm characteristics predict the identity of the long or short momentum
anomaly drivers, they do not help us to improve on the strength of this anomaly, either
in-sample or out-of-sample. Thus, the ability of these firm characteristics to condition
the momentum anomaly is either weak (from an economic perspective) or unstable
over time.
We also study persistence in the propensity of being an anomaly driver. We do
so because many studies argue that a stock’s risk characteristics evolve only slowly
over time. Thus, if rational risk factors were behind the characteristic anomalies, we
would expect at least some persistence in the propensity of being an anomaly driver.
In contrast, if the characteristic effects were generated by behavioral bias-induced
mispricing, we would expect no or little persistence if the characteristic effect were
the correction of the mispricing. Alternatively, if the characteristic effect was the mis-
pricing itself, we would expect negative persistence. Our results show that being an
anomaly driver in one period fails to significantly increase the probability of becom-
ing one in the next. Also, the long (short) anomaly drivers continue to outperform
3 An excellent example comes from Hong and Stein (1999). These authors show that micro-cap stocks do
not produce a momentum anomaly, but that there is a monotonically negative relationship between market
size and this anomaly among the remaining stocks. Including an interaction between market size and the
momentum return in an FM regression would not capture this highly non-linear relationship.
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(underperform) matched stocks for only one more investment period after the initial
one.
We next turn to the question of which theory is most consistent with our findings.
Both idiosyncratic volatility and distress risk can sometimes act as rational pricing
factors in modern pricing theories (Merton 1987; Malkiel and Xu 2006; Li et al. 2009;
George and Hwang 2010). Thus, at least at first sight, our results are consistent with
systematic risk differences underlying the characteristic anomalies. However, if the
anomalies were due to such differences, the long size and BM drivers should be more
volatile and distressed—while the short size and BM drivers should be less volatile
and distressed—than the matched stocks. Because both the long and short size and
BM drivers are more volatile and sometimes more distressed than the matched stocks,
the data do not support the rational theories.
At first sight, our results are also consistent with the possibility that market
microstructure-induced biases drive the characteristic anomalies—at least if volatile
and distressed stocks were illiquid and traded at low prices. However, given that we
directly control for share illiquidity and share price effects, it is unlikely that market
microstructure effects play a major role.
In our opinion, the most convincing interpretation is that a high idiosyncratic
volatility renders the size and BM anomaly drivers difficult to arbitrage, allowing
for mispricing among them. In fact, supporting Avramov et al. (2009, 2011), our
evidence shows that investors seem to systematically undervalue (overvalue) small
(large) distressed stocks.
The result that no existing theory is able to explain the momentum anomaly is dis-
appointing, but consistent with this anomaly being different from others. For example,
different from others, the momentum anomaly is most pronounced outside of January
and in expansions (Chan et al. 1996; Chordia and Shivakumar 2002; Griffin et al.
2003; Cooper et al. 2004).
Our study contributes to a large literature developing and testing theories explaining
characteristic anomalies in stock returns. One school, the neoclassical, claims that
the characteristic anomalies arise because the firm characteristics capture omitted or
mismeasured pricing factors (Fama and French 1992, 1993, 1995; Carhart 1997;
Berk et al. 1999, etc.). Another school, the behavioral, claims that the characteristic
anomalies arise because of equity mispricing. The equity mispricing persists because
of limits to arbitrage, such as a high (idiosyncratic) volatility or high transaction costs
(Lakonishok et al. 1994; Chan et al. 1996; La Porta 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1997;
Zhang 2006, etc.). Finally, the bias-based school claims the characteristic anomalies
are spurious phenomena that are generated by data-mining or -snooping or market
microstructure-induced biases. Even if the characteristic anomalies were real, this
school argues that they could not be exploited due to investment restrictions or trading
costs (Kaul and Nimalendran 1989; Ball et al. 1995; Lesmond et al. 2004, etc.).
Our contribution to the above literature is not to offer new theories trying to explain
the characteristic anomalies. Instead, we recognize that there is so far no study directly
comparing the validity of the testable implications generated by the existing theories.
As a result, we offer a joint test of existing theories, determining which ones are rela-
tivelymore andwhichones are relatively less successful in explaining the characteristic
anomalies.
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Our study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the rational, behavioral, and
bias-based theories trying to explain the size, BM, and momentum anomalies. It also
derives testable implications from these theories. Section 3 describes the methodology
used in this article. In Sect. 4,we reviewour proxyvariables anddata sources. In Sect. 5,
we present our empirical results. Section 6 concludes. All technical details are given
in the Appendix.
2 Hypotheses development
In this section, we look at neoclassical, behavioral, and bias-based theories trying to
explain the existence of the size,BM, andmomentumanomalies. In the first subsection,
we review the theories. In the second,we use each theory to derive testable implications
regarding the relationships between certain firm characteristics and the propensity
of becoming a stock significantly contributing to an anomaly, either by producing
abnormally high or low returns.
2.1 Theories explaining the characteristic anomalies
2.1.1 Neoclassical (rational expectations) theories
Neoclassical theories relying on rational expectations argue that the characteristic
anomalies arise because of the differences in systematic risk between the stocks pro-
ducing abnormally high returns and those producing abnormally low returns. They
further claim that standard asset pricing tests do not capture these differences either
due to omitted or mismeasured pricing factors. If the neoclassical theories were cor-
rect, we would always be able to transform the firm characteristics into covariances
between returns and systematic factors calculated from the firm characteristics. Sup-
porting this requirement, Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) show that firm
characteristic-based spread portfolios indeed explain the anomalies.4
Other neoclassical studies search more directly for the systematic risk factors
underlying the firm characteristics. For example, Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and
Lewellen and Nagel (2006) report mixed evidence about whether size and BM are effi-
cient proxies for the conditional market beta. Hahn and Lee (2006), Petkova (2006),
and Aretz et al. (2010) show that size, BM, and momentum are related to impor-
tant macroeconomic risks. Merton (1987) and Malkiel and Xu (2006) show that, in
a world in which investors are only able to invest into an investor-specific restricted
set of assets, idiosyncratic volatility is positively priced and the firm characteristics
could capture this pricing relationship. Under asymmetric information about firm
value, the firm characteristics could also capture a positive (Lambert et al. 2007) or
negative (Johnson 2004) uncertainty premium. Finally, if uninformed investors need
to be compensated for asymmetric information, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)
4 Unfortunately, Daniel and Titman (1997) show that the firm characteristics have a greater pricing ability
than the exposures of spread portfolios formed using the firm characteristics.
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and Amihud (2002) show that the firm characteristics could also capture a positive
relationship between share illiquidity and stock returns.
Another possibility is that the firm characteristics capture systematic distress risk.
Supporting this possibility, Queen and Roll (1987), Chan and Chen (1991), and Fama
and French (1995) show that small and value stocks are often more distressed than big
and growth stocks. Also, Avramov et al. (2011) show that trading strategies trying to
exploit the size, BM, and momentum anomalies are often implicitly long on highly
distressed stocks. Despite this, two caveats are that modern asset pricing theory does
not always predict a positive distress risk premium (Garlappi et al. 2008; George and
Hwang 2010, etc.) and that the majority of empirical studies fail to find one (Dichev
1998; Campbell et al. 2008, etc.).
2.1.2 Behavioral theories
Behavioral theories argue that the characteristic anomalies arise because some
investors are cognitively biased and their biases create mispricing (Lakonishok et al.
1994; La Porta 1996; Barberis et al. 1998, etc.). They further argue that more ratio-
nal investors are unable to exploit the opportunities arising from this mispricing due
to limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). A promising candidate for a limit
to arbitrage is idiosyncratic volatility. To see this, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)
show that the ability to hedge arbitrage risk decreases with idiosyncratic volatility.
Another limit to arbitrage could be high transaction costs rendering arbitrage trades
prohibitively expensive (Xue and Zhang 2011).
Daniel et al. (1998) propose a model in which cognitive biases become more pro-
nounced after the receipt of good news andwhen there ismore information uncertainty.
Thus, assuming limits to arbitrage, Cooper et al. (2004) test whether characteristic
anomalies are more pronounced in expansions (after a sequence of positive market
returns), and Zhang (2006) tests whether they aremore pronounced among stocks with
more uncertain information environments. Finally, because financial distress makes
stocks harder to value, Avramov et al. (2009) test whether characteristic anomalies are
mainly driven by distressed stocks.
2.1.3 Biased-based theories
Biased-based theories argue that the characteristic anomalies are spuriously driven
by academics engaging in data-mining or -snooping or by market microstructure-
induced return biases (Black 1993; Kothari et al. 1995, etc.). The bid-ask bounce and
non-synchronous trading are market microstructure biases that could be behind the
anomalies. For example, Blume and Stambaugh (1983) show that the bid-ask bounce
leads to upward bias in the returns of stocks trading at low prices. Boguth et al. (2011)
show that non-synchronous trading leads to downward bias in the returns of value-
weighted portfolios mostly invested in illiquid stocks. Other studies in this school
argue that the characteristic anomalies are not really spurious, but that they cannot
be exploited because of transaction costs, share illiquidity, or investment restrictions
(Lesmond et al. 2004). For example, most asset managers are only allowed to invest
into stocks featured in specific large stock market indexes (e.g., the Russell 1000).
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2.2 Testable implications
The above theories generate testable implications regarding the relationships between
certain firm characteristics and the propensity of a stock to become an anomaly driver.
We summarize these testable implications in Table 1. The table does not distinguish
between the anomalies because the relationships predicted by each theory do not differ
across anomalies.
The neoclassical theories argue that the long anomaly drivers—those producing
abnormally high returns—are riskier than otherwise identical stocks, while the short
anomaly drivers—those producing abnormally low returns—are less risky. Because
these theories suggest that a high market-, SMB-, HML-, or WML beta, a high idio-
syncratic volatility, and a high share illiquidity signal a high systematic risk, stocks
with such traits are expected to become long anomaly drivers. In contrast, because a
low market-, SMB-, HML-, and WML beta, a low idiosyncratic volatility, and a low
share illiquidity signal a low systematic risk, stocks with such traits are expected to
become short anomaly drivers. Because neoclassical theories can produce a positive
or negative relationship between distress risk and uncertainty, on the one hand, and
systematic risk, on the other, it is impossible to predict how these firm characteristics
affect the propensity of becoming an anomaly driver. However, whatever the exact
Table 1 Relationships between theories, firm characteristics, and the anomaly drivers
Firm characteristics Capturing Neoclassical Behavioral Bias-based
LAD SAD LAD SAD LAD SAD
Risk exposures Systematic risk + − NA NA NA NA
Idiosyncratic volatilities Systematic risk; limits to
arbitrage
+ − + + NA NA
Information uncertainty Systematic risk; mispricing ?a ?a + + NA NA
Share illiquidity Systematic risk; limits to
arbitrage; spurious effects
+ − + + + +
Distress risk Systematic risk; mispricing ?a ?a + + NA NA
Transaction costs Limits to arbitrage; spurious
effects
NA NA + + + +
Bid-ask bounce Spurious effects NA NA NA NA + +
Non-synchronous trading Spurious effects NA NA NA NA + +
Index inclusion Spurious effects NA NA − − − −
In this table, we report the relationships between several firm characteristics and the propensity of becoming
an anomaly driver, as predicted by the neoclassical, behavioral, and biased-based theories meant to explain
the size, BM, andmomentum anomalies. The table distinguishes between the propensity of becoming a long
(LAD) or a short (SAD) anomaly driver. However, because the predicted relationships do not differ across
the anomalies, it does not distinguish between the anomalies. The column labeled “Firm characteristics”
gives the names of the theory-implied firm characteristics. The column labeled “Possibly Capturing” shows
the economic concept(s) captured by the theory-implied firm characteristics. A “+” (“−”) sign indicates
that the propensity of becoming an anomaly driver increases (decreases) with the firm characteristic. “NA”
indicates that the theory does not predict a relationship between the propensity of becoming a (long or short)
anomaly driver and the firm characteristic, while a “?” indicates that the relationship is ambiguous
a Although the sign of the relationship is ambiguous, the firm characteristic needs to predict the long and
short anomaly drivers with opposite signs in order to support this theory
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relationships are, theory predicts that they condition the propensity of becoming a
long anomaly driver with the opposite sign from the propensity of becoming a short
anomaly driver.5
Behavioral theories argue that both the long and short anomaly drivers are difficult
to arbitrage and thus mispriced. Thus, variables positively (negatively) correlated with
limits to arbitrage are expected to be positively (negatively) related to the propensity of
becoming a long- or short anomaly driver. More specifically, because a high volatility
and high transaction costs create limits to arbitrage, the long and short anomaly drivers
are predicted to be associated with a high volatility and high transaction costs. Also, if
financial distress renders stock valuation harder, distress risk is expected to forecast the
identity of the long and short anomaly drivers with a positive sign. Finally, if cognitive
biases increase with information uncertainty, both the long and short anomaly drivers
are expected to suffer from high uncertainty.
Some bias-based theories claim that the characteristic anomalies are spuriously
driven bymarketmicrostructure biases. Becausemarketmicrostructure biases aremost
pronounced at low share prices and share liquidity levels, penny stocks and illiquid
stocks (as, e.g., identified by a low trading volume or a high fraction of zero return
days) are expected to be more likely to become long or short anomaly drivers. Other
biased-based theories claim that the characteristic anomalies cannot be exploited due to
transaction costs. Because a high fraction of zero return days and a low trading volume
signal high transaction costs (Kyle 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Lesmond et al.
1999), these traits are also expected to predict the identity of the long and short anomaly
drivers. Finally, if investment restrictions contribute to the anomalies, stocks featured
in large indexes are less likely to become anomaly drivers.
3 Methodology
In this section, we review our empirical design. In the first subsection, we offer an
intuitive description of how we use statistical leverage analysis to identify the set of
stocks most strongly contributing to the anomalies. Next, we outline how we exam-
ine the relationships between the firm characteristics suggested by the neoclassical,
behavioral, and biased-based theories and the propensity of becoming an anomaly
driver. In the second subsection, we offer tests verifying our empirical design. We also
compare our empirical design with an alternative one.
3.1 The statistical leverage analysis
3.1.1 Identification of the anomaly drivers
We run a statistical leverage analysis on cross-sectional regressions of stock returns
on firm characteristics. To see why this makes sense, consider the following statistical
5 For example, if distressed stocks have a high systematic risk, then safe stocks must have a low systematic
risk. Under these circumstances, a high distress risk predicts a high propensity of becoming a long anomaly
driver, and a low distress risk a high propensity of becoming a short anomaly driver.
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model in which the expected return, E[ri,t ], is linear in K exogenous variables:
E[ri,t ] = r0 + x (1)i,t γ (1)t + x (2)i,t γ (2)t + · · · + x (K )i,t γ (K )t , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , (1)
where ri,t is the return of stock i in month t , r0 is the return of an asset which has zero
values on all the exogenous variables, x (k)i,t is the kth exogenous variable, γ
(k)
t is the
slope coefficient on the kth exogenous variable, and N is the number of stocks.





wi E[ri,t ] = r0
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where rp,t is portfolio p’s return in month t and wi are the portfolio weights. To
estimate the slope coefficient of exogenous variable k, we impose on the weights the
restrictions that (i)
∑N









i,t = 0 if j = k. Doing so, we ensure that E[rp,t ] = γ (k)t .
Hence, we interpret the slope coefficient as the expected return of a zero investment
portfolio with unit values on one exogenous variable and zero values on all the other
exogenous variables. Because there are always an infinite number of portfolio weight-
sets fulfilling these restrictions, we choose from them the one set that minimizes
portfolio variance, thereby also minimizing the standard error of the slope coefficient
estimate.
Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama (1976) show that the above set of desired
portfolio weights can be derived from cross-sectional ordinary-least squares (OLS)
regressions of stock returns on the exogenous variables (“Fama–MacBeth (1973)
methodology”). To see how this works, collect the month t-stock returns in an [N ×1]
vector R and a constant plus the month t-exogenous variables in an [N × (K + 1)]
matrix X and run an OLS regression of R on X. The vector of parameter estimates
from this regression, γˆ , is given by:
γˆ = (XTX)−1XTR =
N∑
i=1
Wi ri,t , (3)
whereW = (XTX)−1XT, andWi is the i th column of theWmatrix. The (k+1)th row
of W gives the desired portfolio weights for exogenous variable k, and the (k + 1)th
row of γˆ gives the estimate of the month t-specific slope coefficient of the kth exoge-
nous variable. Averaging exogenous variable k’s month t-specific slope coefficient
estimates over our sample period gives us an estimate of the unconditional slope coef-
ficient of the kth exogenous variable, which is an estimate of the expected return of a
zero investment portfolio with a unit value on exogenous variable k and zero values on
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Fig. 1 Example statistical leverage analysis. This figure gives a scatter-plot showing the month t-return of
six stocks on the y-axis and their values for an undefined firm characteristic on the x-axis. The figure also
shows the best-fit line from an OLS regression of the returns on the firm characteristic
all others.6,7 In the remainder, we call the unconditional slope coefficient associated
with a firm characteristic a “characteristic effect.”
Our aim is to identify the stocks that have the most positive or negative effect on a
characteristic effect (“anomaly drivers”). To do so, we use statistical leverage analysis.
Particularly, we define as anomaly drivers those stocks whose joint exclusion from the
cross-sectional regression of R on X produces the largest decline in the strength of
the characteristic effect (see Belsley et al. 1980; Davidson and MacKinnon 2004). To
see how this works, we offer an example in Fig. 1. The figure is a scatter-plot showing
the month t-returns of six stocks on the y-axis and their values for an undefined
firm characteristic on the x-axis. The figure also gives the best-fit line (the optimal
prediction) from a regression of the six stock returns on their corresponding firm
characteristic-values. The slope of the best-fit line, which is around 0.053 (5.3 %), is
an estimate of the month t-specific slope coefficient (effect) of the firm characteristic.
Looking at the single observation pairs, it is obvious that stock A contributes more
to the 5.3 %-coefficient estimate than stock B. To be more specific, in the absence of
stock A, the estimate collapses to close to zero (−0.1 %). In contrast, in the absence
of stock B, the estimate almost doubles (10.1 %). The spread between the estimate
6 Alternatively, we are able to obtain estimates of the unconditional slope coefficients by running a single
panel data regression of stock returns on firm characteristics. The parameter estimates from this regression
can directly be interpreted as estimates of the unconditional slope coefficients of the K exogenous variables.
Correcting for cross-sectional dependence in the residuals, Cochrane (2001) shows that the panel data
regression is expected to produce results that are virtually identical to those from FM regressions.
7 In their work, Fama and MacBeth (1973) use portfolios as test assets in their methodology, arguing
that portfolios are less subject to estimation error in their exogenous variables, especially the market beta.
Because our tests do not involve the market beta, we are less worried about estimation error and thus resort
to single stocks as test assets. Also, given that the CAPMwas the only well-accepted asset pricing model in
the early 1970s, Fama andMacBeth (1973) refer to only the average slope coefficient estimate on the market
beta estimate as risk premium estimate.Whether the average slope coefficients on other exogenous variables
constitute risk premia estimates has become less clear since the development of multi-factor pricingmodels.
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excluding stock i and the full sample estimate is the statistical leverage of stock i .
Thus, stock A has a statistical leverage of−5.4 % ((−0.1 %)–5.3 %), implying that its
inclusion strengthens the characteristic effect (i.e., turns it more positive). In contrast,
stock B has a statistical leverage of 5.0 % (10.3–5.3 %), implying that its inclusion
dampens the characteristic effect (i.e., turns it less positive).
In our empirical tests, we determine which set of stocks has the most pronounced
positive or negative impact on a characteristic effect while simultaneously controlling
for the effects of other firm characteristics. To do so, we derive an analytical formula
for the impact of excluding an arbitrary set of stocks from the regression of R on
X in the Appendix. In theory, we could use this formula to search over all possible
candidate sets until we find the desired one. However, in practice, there are too many
stocks in most cross sections for this approach to be feasible. To give an example,
assume there are 500 stocks in the cross section (a conservative number). We aim to
identify those 25 that most strongly contribute to a characteristic effect. In this case,
we would need to search over around 4.96×1044 possible candidate sets of 25 stocks.
Fortunately, the Appendix shows that, as the number of stocks in the cross section
grows large relative to the number of excluded stocks, the effect of jointly excluding
an arbitrary set of stocks converges to the sum of the effects of individually excluding
the same stocks. Thus, in our empirical tests, we identify those stocks as anomaly
drivers that have the most pronounced (either positive or negative) individual impacts
on a characteristic effect.
In our empirical tests, we do not consider a stock’s statistical leverage over a single
month, but instead over the investment period from July of year t to June of year
t + 1. However, because we assume that investors use the start of the investment
period values of the firm characteristics for each month in this investment period (see
Sect. 4.1), a stock’s investment period-statistical leverage is simply the sum of its
monthly statistical leverage estimates obtained from the cross-sectional regressions
associated with the investment period. Thus, we use the sum of a stock’s monthly
statistical leverage estimates over this period to identify the anomaly drivers.
We split the anomaly drivers into stocks producing abnormally high returns and
those producing abnormally low returns. For positively signed characteristic effects,
such as the BM and momentum effects, the stocks producing abnormally high (low)
returns have a negative statistical leverage and an above (below) median anomaly
variable value. For negatively signed characteristic effects, such as the size effect, the
stocks producing abnormally high (low) returns have a positive statistical leverage and
a below (above) median anomaly variable value. Because the stocks producing abnor-
mally high returns would be held on the long side of a portfolio trying to exploit the
anomaly,we call them long anomaly drivers. Because the stocks producing abnormally
low returns would be held on the short side of a portfolio trying to exploit the anomaly,
we call them short anomaly drivers. The long anomaly drivers are small, value, and
winners stocks; the short anomaly drivers are large, growth, and loser stocks.
To match the anomaly drivers with non-anomaly drivers, we search the 20 % of
stocks that contribute the least to a characteristic effect for that stock whose anomaly
variable value is closest to the value of the anomaly driver. To use the size anomaly as
an example, we match each size anomaly driver with that stock from the 20%weakest
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contributors to the size anomaly whose size value is closest to that of the size anomaly
driver.
3.1.2 Comparing anomaly- and non-anomaly drivers
Our next step is to compare those stocks that significantly contribute to a characteristic
effect (the anomaly drivers)with otherwise identical firms that do not (the non-anomaly
drivers). To do so, we first contrast the mean values of the theory-implied firm char-
acteristics generated by the long or short anomaly drivers with those generated by the
matched stocks. To give an example, we analyze whether the long BManomaly drivers
tend to suffer from a higher or lower share illiquidity than similar BM value-non BM
anomaly drivers. To control for correlation between the firm characteristics, we also
estimate the following LOGIT model:
HLDt,t+1 = 1
1 + e−X ′tβ + t,t+1, (4)
where HLDt,t+1 is a dummy equal to one if a stock is classified as a size, BM, or
momentum driver over the investment period and zero otherwise, X a vector con-
taining the firm characteristics and controls measured at the start of the investment
period, and t,t+1 the residual. To be consistent with the mean comparisons, we run
the LOGIT estimations separately for stocks in anomaly decile one or ten, where the
stocks in decile one (ten) are those with an anomaly variable value in the bottom (top)
decile at the start of the investment period. To further control for differences in size,
BM, and momentum, we include these variables as controls. To calculate unbiased
inferences, we cluster standard errors at the stock-investment period level (Petersen
2009). We estimate Eq. (4) using either the entire data sample (in-sample; IS) or recur-
sive windows of data (out-of-sample; OOS). The initial recursive window ranges from
June 1974 to June 1982, and we extend the recursive window on an annual basis.
We stress that the estimates obtained from the LOGIT model in Eq. (4) do not
suffer from an error-in-variables bias. While it is true that HLDt,t+1 is estimated with
error, we only use HLDt,t+1 as endogenous variable in the LOGIT model. Thus, the
estimation error inflates the volatility of the residual, but it does not bias the parameter
estimates.
We use Chan et al.’s (2003) run test to study persistence in becoming an anomaly
driver. The run test compares the proportions of stocks consistently classified as long
or short anomaly drivers over expanding numbers of investment periods with the
proportions expected under the null hypothesis of no persistence. We give a technical
overview of this test—and the derivation of a test statistic showing whether the null
hypothesis of no persistence can be rejected—in the Appendix. To only compare
similar stocks, we conduct the run tests separately for stocks in the top or bottom size,
BM, or momentum decile, where we determine inclusion in a decile using anomaly
variable values measured at the start of the investment period.
We also studywhether stocks classified as anomaly drivers in one investment period
continue to produce abnormal returns in later investment periods. Todo so,we calculate
the return spread between anomaly drivers and matched non-anomaly drivers over
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various post-holding periods. To adjust for other characteristic effects, we use raw and
adjusted returns in these tests. The adjusted return is the raw return minus the return
of the three-way sorted size, BM, and momentum portfolio to which a stock belongs
(Daniel et al. 1997).
3.2 Verification and comparison tests
Table 2 verifies that it is reasonable to approximate the joint effect from excluding a
subset of stocks with the sum of the individual effects (see Sect. 3.1.1). To achieve
this goal, the table uses real cross-sectional data featuring all US stocks at the end of
December 1986, December 1995, or December 2006. We aim to exclude from these
cross sections ten, 100, 500, or 1000 stocks (# Excl.). To do so, we create one million
random sets of excluded stocks for each cross section-number of excluded stocks pair.
For each random set, we calculate the sum of the individual effects and the joint effect
from excluding the random set from the regression of returns on size (Panel A), BM
(Panel B), or momentum (Panel C).8 To test for bias, we regress the joint effect on the
sum of the individual effects. Moreover, we calculate the Euclidean distance between
the sum of the individual effects and the joint effect. Finally, we compute the ranking
orders for both, subtract these from one another, take the absolute value, and sum up
the absolute values (‘RD’). A greater RDvalue indicates greater disagreement between
the ranking orders obtained from the sum of the individual effects and the joint effect.
The regression constants in Table 2 suggest that there is never any constant bias in
the sum of the individual effects relative to the joint effect. Also, when the number of
excluded stocks is low, the slope coefficient values are all close to unity, suggesting
that there is no variable bias either. However, as we exclude a larger number of stocks,
the slope coefficients rise above unity, and the Euclidian distance becomes greater than
zero. Notwithstanding, the R-squareds remain above 99 % and the RD statistic stays
at 0.00. Taken together, these results suggest that, when excluding 500 or 1000 stocks,
the joint effect becomes an order of magnitude larger than the sum of the individual
effects, but the two remain almost perfectly correlated. Overall, the evidence in Table 2
suggests that our methodology works well for our purposes.
As a next step, we compare our statistical leverage approach with another approach
that can be used to filter out important observations from regressions. Knez and Ready
(1997) useRousseeuw’s (1984) least-trimmed squares (LTS) estimator to identifywhat
they call “influential stocks” in asset pricing tests. The LTS estimator, denoted by γ˜ ,












8 We shall describe our data sources and variable definitions in greater detail below.
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Fig. 2 Comparison statistical leveragemethodwith least-trimmed squaremethod. This figure shows scatter
plots for the March 1998 cross-sectional regressions of the stock return on size (upper graphs), BM (middle
graphs), or momentum (lower graphs). The black lines are the fitted values calculated from the full sample
regression, the gray lines those from subsample regressions. The subsamples exclude either the 1 % of
stocks whose exclusion maximizes the subsamples’ R-squareds (left graphs) or the strongest 1 % anomaly
drivers (i.e., those stocks whose exclusion produces the greatest decline in the characteristic effect; right
graphs). The fat dots indicate the excluded stocks
where r = N (1 − α), α is the fraction of excluded stocks, N is the total number
of stocks, and  = {φ1, φ2, . . . , φr } is a specific subset of r stocks from a set of N
stocks.9
To demonstrate that their influential stocks are distinct from our anomaly drivers,
Fig. 2 offers scatter-plots for the March 1998-cross-sectional regressions of stock
returns on size (upper panels), BM (middle panels), or momentum (lower panels). In
each sub-panel, the black lines are the best-fit lines from full sample regressions. The
gray lines are the best-fit lines from regressions excluding the 1 % of stocks whose
9 Because the computation of the LTS estimator is complicated for large samples, the estimator is usually
calculated using the iterative approximation proposed by Rousseeuw and Van Driessen (2006).
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exclusion maximizes the subsamples’ R-squareds (left panels) and the 1 % of stocks
that most strongly contribute to a characteristic effect (right panels). Excluded stocks
are shown in bold. The figure shows that the two approaches exclude different sets of
stocks. In particular, the statistical leverage analysis approach excludes those stocks
that most strongly affect the regressions’ slope coefficients, whereas the LTS-based
approach excludes those stocks that produce the largest absolute residuals.10
4 Proxy variables and data
4.1 Proxy variables
Size is the natural log of the number of shares outstanding times the stock price. The
BM ratio is the natural log of the ratio of the book value per share to themarket value.11
Momentum is the compounded return over the previous 3 months. We have chosen
to study the 3-month—instead of the more commonly used 12-month—compounded
return because this choice generates a strongermomentumeffect in our data.Regarding
timing conventions, we assume that investors observe the current size and momentum
values and the 6-month lagged BM ratio values in June of each year t . They rely on
these values until June of year t + 1, at which point they update them. Doing so, we
ensure that we use only information available to investors at the time. We rely on the
same conventions when forming portfolios.
We estimate a stock’s market-(MKT), SMB-, HML-, and WML betas using stock-
specific time-series regressions of the return on these pricing factors. We run these
time-series regressions over the former 48 months of monthly data. As an alternative,
we follow Lewellen and Nagel (2006) and estimate the market beta (MKT BETA
(ALT)) by running stock-specific time-series regressions of the return on the excess
market return, the 1 day-lagged excess market return, and the sum of the 2 day-, 3 day-,
and 4 day-lagged excess market returns:
ri,t =αi + βi,1rmkt,t + βi,2rmkt,t−1 + βi,3(rmkt,t−2 + rmkt,t−3 + rmkt,t−4)/3 + i,t ,
(6)
where ri,t is stock i’s return over day t , rmkt,t is the excess market return, αi , βi,1,
βi,2, and βi,3 are parameters, and i,t is the residual. We run regression (6) over daily
data from month t , and calculate the month t-market beta estimate as the sum of the
slope coefficients. We include the lagged market returns in the regression to alleviate
10 We have also compared a stock’s statistical leverage for the size, BM, and momentum anomalies with
its exposures to the SMB, HML, and WML spread portfolios. The spread portfolio exposures are often
interpreted as indicating the co-movement between a stock’s return and the return of a certain class of
stocks. For example, a high SMB exposure indicates that a stock’s return co-moves strongly with the return
of small stocks. However, despite this, there is nothing to suggest that the spread portfolio exposures capture
a stock’s contribution to a characteristic anomaly. Supporting this last argument, the correlation between
a stock’s contribution to the size (BM) [momentum] effect and its SMB (HML) [WML] exposure is only
0.0095 (−0.0045) [−0.0060].
11 We also use a version of BM adjusted for deferred taxes, investment tax credits, and preferred shares (as
in Fama and French 1992). Our conclusions are insensitive to which version we use.
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non-synchronous trading biases. In an earlier version of this article, we also studied
the macroeconomic exposures suggested by Chan et al. (1985) and Chen et al. (1986).
However, because these never produced any statistically or economically significant
evidence, we dropped them again from our analysis.
To proxy for idiosyncratic volatility, we use the annualized standard deviation of
the residual from stock-specific market- or Carhart (1997, FFC)-model estimations
run over the previous 48 months of monthly data (IVOL(MKT) and IVOL(FFC),
respectively). Wemeasure distress risk using the return-on-assets (ROA), the dividend
yield (DIVY), Merton’s (1974) distance-to-default (DEFR), and the size decile to
which a stock belonged 60 months before the current date (SIZEDEC). We investigate
the lagged size decile to test the hypothesis that the anomaly drivers tend to be “fallen
angels” (Chan and Chen 1991). We follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) in extracting the
distance-to-default fromMerton’s (1974) model. To proxy for share illiquidity, we use
the average ratio of the absolute return to trading volume (Amihud 2002, ILLIQ) over
the previous 12 months. Trading volume (VOL) is the mean log trading volume—
and the fraction of zero return days (ZERORET) the number of zero return days
divided by the number of non-missing return days—both calculated over the previous
12 months.
To study the importance of bid-ask bounce biases (which are especially pronounced
at lowshare prices),weuse adummyvariable equal to one if the share price is belowone
dollar and else zero (PRC; Blume and Stambaugh 1983). Because non-synchronous
trading biases are most pronounced among illiquid stocks (Boguth et al. 2011), we
use the share illiquidity proxies ILLIQ, VOL, and ZERORET to proxy for these.
To measure information uncertainty, we derive the number of analysts providing an
earnings forecast for the next fiscal year end over the prior 12 months (ANALYST).
To proxy for investment restrictions, we use a dummy variable equal to one if a stock
belongs to the S&P 1500 and zero otherwise (INDEX).
All exogenous variables are measured at the start of the investment period (June of
year t), using only information that was available to investors at the time.
4.2 Data sources
Market data are from CRSP and accounting data from COMPUSTAT. We also use
COMPUSTAT data to identify the stocks in the S&P 1500 index. Data on the bench-
mark factors are from Kenneth French’s website. Analyst data are from I/B/E/S.
Because many variables are unavailable before June 1974, our sample ranges from
this date to December 2007.
5 Empirical results
This section presents our empirical results. In the first subsection, we study the strength
and robustness of the size, BM, and momentum effects in our data. In the second, we
compare the anomaly driverswith otherwise similar non-anomaly drivers along several
theory-implied firm characteristics. The third subsection uses these theory-implied
firmcharacteristics to construct subsamples of stocks inwhich the characteristic effects
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are expected to be particularly strong or weak. The final subsection studies persistence
in the anomaly drivers.
5.1 Strengths of the characteristic effects
In Table 3, we show the results from FM regressions of stock returns on size, BM, and
momentum. PanelAgives the results from full sample estimations. PanelsB andCgive
those from subsamples excluding specific subsets of stocks. The subsamples used in
Panel B exclude those stocks whose removal maximizes the subsamples’ R-squareds
[Knez and Ready’s (1997) LTS approach], whereas the subsamples used in Panel C
exclude those stocks whose removal turns the characteristic effects least pronounced
(our statistical leverage approach).
Panel A shows that the full sample creates strong size (−1.92 % p.a., t-stat −3.58)
and BM (3.96 % p.a., t-stat 5.64) effects, but only weak momentum effects (5.52 %
p.a., t-stat 1.75).12 Excluding 0.10 or 1 % of the sample using the LTS-based approach
eliminates the size effect, but amplifies theBMandmomentum effects (Panel B). Thus,
results again suggest that the LTS-based approach does not necessarily identify those
stocks that are most responsible for the characteristic effects. In contrast, excluding
0.10 % of the sample using the statistical leverage-based approach eliminates the size
and momentum effects and reduces the BM effect to half of its former value (Panel C).
Despite this, the BM effect continues to be statistically significant. Excluding 1 % of
the sample using the same approach turns all characteristic effects significant again,
this time, however, with opposite signs.13
5.2 Comparison of anomaly- and non-anomaly drivers
Table 4 offers univariate comparisons of the anomaly drivers and the matched non-
anomaly drivers across firm characteristics suggested by the neoclassical, behavioral,
and bias-based theories to predict the anomaly drivers. A stock is classified as an
anomaly driver if it ranks among the top percentile anomaly drivers over the July of
year t to June of year t + 1-investment period; the matched non-anomaly are from the
sample of the 20 % weakest contributors to the same anomaly over the same period
(see Sect. 3.1.1). The first column of the table compares the whole set of anomaly
drivers with all other stocks; the second and third separately compare the long and
short anomaly drivers with matched non-anomaly drivers.14
12 We annualize the per-month characteristic effect estimates in Table 3 by multiplying them by 12.
13 The panel data regression methodology produces a size effect of −2.21 % p.a. (t-stat of −3.02), a BM
effect of 5.06 % p.a. (t-stat of 3.98) and a momentum effect of 3.85 % p.a. (t-stat of 0.56; unreported).
Setting the characteristic effects equal to zero requires us to exclude 0.15 % of all stocks from the size
estimation, 0.34 % of all stocks from the BM estimation, and 0.01 % of all stocks from the momentum
estimation.
14 We only report empirical results based on anomaly drivers identified using FM regressions featuring
only one anomaly variable. Neither controlling for other anomaly variables nor using panel data regressions
in identifying the anomaly drivers (see footnotes 4 and 8) greatly changes our conclusions.
123
Which stocks drive the size, value, and momentum anomalies… 37
Table 3 Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions
Anomaly Exp sign Sort out Constant Size BM Mom
Panel A: OLS regression
Size − 2.07∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗
BM + 1.65∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
Mom + 0.96∗∗ 0.46∗
All −/+/+ 1.88∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗
Panel B: Least-trimmed square
Trimmed at the 0.1 % level (mean of 5 observations per estimation excluded)
Size − 1.34∗∗∗ −0.03
BM + 1.46∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
Mom + 0.41 0.82∗∗∗
All −/+/+ 0.94* −0.05 0.27∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
Trimmed at the 1 % level (mean of 54 observations per estimation excluded)
Size − −0.17 0.21∗∗∗
BM + 1.02∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
Mom + −0.59 1.37∗∗∗
All −/+/+ −0.89* 0.21∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
Panel C: Leverage-point elimination square
Trimmed at the 0.1 % level (mean of 5 observations per estimation excluded)
Size − 1.28∗∗∗ −0.02
BM + 1.53∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
Mom + 2.18∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗
All −/+/+ Size 1.03∗∗ −0.03 0.29∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗
All −/+/+ BM 1.68∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.04 0.56∗∗
All −/+/+ Mom 2.82∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗
Trimmed at the 1 % level (mean of 54 observations per estimation excluded)
Size − −0.98∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
BM + 1.23∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗
Mom + 5.64∗∗∗ −4.18∗∗∗
All −/+/+ Size −1.32∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
All −/+/+ BM 1.55∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
All −/+/+ Mom 5.78∗∗∗ −0.06 0.29∗∗∗ −3.93∗∗∗
The table shows the results from Fama–MacBeth (1973) regressions of the stock return on size, BM, and
momentum, either separately or jointly. Under ‘exp sign’, we show the signs of the relationship expected
from prior empirical work. Parameter estimates (est) are per month and in bold. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ indicate
that the parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 99, 95, and 90%confidence levels, respectively.
In Panel A, we perform the FM regressions on the full sample. In Panel B, we exclude the 0.10 or 1 %
of stocks from each cross-sectional regression whose omission maximizes the subsamples’ R-squareds.
In Panel C, we exclude those 0.10 or 1 % of stocks from each cross-sectional regression whose omission
produces the greatest decline in a characteristic effect (if the characteristic effect is ambiguous, we indicate
it under ‘sort out’). For the size effect, these are the stocks whose exclusion leads to the greatest increase in
the size effect estimate. In contrast, for the BM andmomentum effects, these are the stocks whose exclusion
leads to the greatest decrease in the BM and momentum effect estimates. The sample period ranges from
July 1974 to December 2007
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42 K. Aretz, M. Aretz
The first column shows that the whole set of anomaly drivers (including the long
and short ones) is often systematically riskier, more volatile, and more financially
distressed than the other stocks. Also, they suffer more strongly from share illiquidity,
aremore likely to trade at lowprices, and are not followed bymany analysts. Separately
considering the long and short anomaly drivers, the second and third columns show
that the long anomaly drivers often have a similar systematic risk than the matched
non-anomaly drivers, but that they are more volatile and distressed. In comparison,
the short anomaly drivers are often riskier (in terms of their market betas) and more
volatile than the matched non-anomaly drivers.
In addition to these general conclusions, the long size effect drivers (the small stocks
with abnormally high returns) are also more liquid, better covered by analysts, and
more prone to trade at low prices than the matched stocks. In contrast, the short size
effect drivers (the large stocks with abnormally low returns) are also more liquid and
better covered by analysts.
The long BM and momentum effect drivers (the value and winner stocks with
abnormally high returns) are less liquid, covered by fewer analysts, and less likely to
be included in a broad stock market index than the matched stocks. However, they
are also more likely to trade at low prices. In comparison, both the short BM and
momentum effect drivers (the growth and loser stocks with abnormally low returns)
are more distressed. However, only the short BM anomaly drivers are also followed
by fewer analyst—while only the short momentum anomaly drivers also suffer from
greater share illiquidity—than the matched stocks.
In Table 5, we show the results from full sample LOGIT estimations of HLDt,t+1,
a dummy variable equal to one if a stock is one of the top percentile anomaly drivers
over the July of year t to June of year t + 1-investment period and else zero, on the
firm characteristics and the anomaly variables measured at the start of the investment
period.15 The results reported in Panels A, B, and C are obtained from running esti-
mations on stocks contained in either the top or the bottom size, BM, and momentum
deciles, respectively.
The table suggests that, even in the presence of the anomaly variables, the firm
characteristics capture a large fraction of the variation in HLDt,t+1. For example,
10.9 % of the variation in becoming a long BM anomaly driver is attributable to the
firm characteristics.
Starting with the small stocks, volatile and distressed (ROA and DEFR) stocks
with low prices are significantly more likely to become a long size anomaly driver,
while illiquid stocks (ZERORET and ILLIQ) are significantly less likely to do so. In
contrast, it is distressed (DEFR) and illiquid (ILLIQ) large stocks with high market—
but lowHML—betas that are significantly more likely to become a short size anomaly
driver (Panel A). Value stocks are significantly more probable to become a long BM
anomaly driver if they are volatile and distressed (ROA and DEFR), trade at high
prices, and have low WML betas. In contrast, it is volatile, lowly priced, but little
followed growth stocks with high market-, HML-, and WML betas, but low SMB
15 IVOL(MKT), VOL, and SIZEDEC are all almost perfectly correlated with IVOL(FFC) or ZERORET.
Thus, we exclude these variables from the LOGIT model estimations. We also exclude MKT BETA (ALT)
because it is poorly measured at the stock level, and INDEX because it rarely varies across stocks.
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44 K. Aretz, M. Aretz
betas that are more prone to become short BM anomaly drivers (Panel B). Finally,
long momentum anomaly drivers are distressed (DEFR) winner stocks that have high
SMB betas and trade at high prices. In contrast, short momentum anomaly drivers are
distressed (DEFR) and illiquid loser stocks with high market betas and high dividends
yields (Panel C).
The above results are bad news for neoclassical theories trying to explain the char-
acteristic anomalies. First, the beta exposures often fail to forecast the identity of the
anomaly drivers with the signs implied by these theories. Second, the neoclassical
theories are inconsistent with the finding that both the long and short anomaly drivers
are often volatile and distressed stocks. The only piece of evidence that could be con-
sistent with these theories is that the short BM anomaly drivers are followed by only
a few analysts. Regarding the size and BM anomalies, our results are more consis-
tent with the behavioral stance that volatility limits arbitrage and leads to mispricing
among distressed growth stocks with uncertain information environments. In addition,
the finding that both the long and short size and BM effect drivers trade at low prices
could indicate that market microstructure biases also contribute to these anomalies.
Somewhat disappointingly, no theory is able to explain the momentum anomaly.
Although both the long and short momentum drivers are distressed, possibly sup-
porting the behavioral theories, neither volatility nor transaction costs act as limits to
arbitrage in their case.
5.3 Fine-tuned size, BM, and momentum strategies
We analyze whether the relationships discovered in the previous subsection help us to
improve on the profitability of strategies trying to exploit the characteristic anomalies.
For each anomaly, we, thus, generate two new samples. The first sample is designed to
create a strong characteristic effect; thus, it contains all stocks except those in deciles
one and ten that are not predicted to become anomaly drivers. The second sample is
designed to create a weak characteristic effect; thus, it contains all stocks except those
in deciles one and ten that are predicted to become anomaly drivers.16 The stocks
predicted to become anomaly drivers are those for which the fitted values from the
LOGIT model in Eq. (4) are above the median cross-sectional fitted value, and vice
versa. We estimate the LOGIT model producing the fitted values either in-sample (IS;
in this case, its coefficient values are given in Table 5) or out-of-sample (OOS). To
ensure that the fitted values do not simply reflect the anomaly variables (size, BM,
and momentum), we always set their slope coefficients equal to zero when calculating
fitted values.
Table 6 shows the size, BM, andmomentum effects separately for the whole sample
and the two new samples. In addition to mean returns, the table also reports the alphas
from the CAPM and the FFC model. The alphas are the intercepts from time-series
regressions of the monthly FM regression-slope coefficients (the month t-conditional
16 We could have used a similar strategy to extract the anomaly- and non-anomaly drivers from the other
eight characteristic deciles. However, given that the majority of anomaly drivers are contained in deciles
one and ten, using this alternative strategy does not change our conclusions.
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characteristic effect estimates) on the relevant pricing factors. The relevant pricing
factors are the excess market return for the CAPM, and the excess market return,
SMB, HML, and WML for the FFC model.
The full sample size, BM, and momentum effects in the table are similar to those
in Table 3.17 More importantly, the size effect is 0.042 % (IS) or 0.061 % (OOS) per
month stronger among stocks predicted to produce a stronger size effect (lev) than
among those predicted to produce a weaker one (no lev, Panel A). Given a –0.106 %-
full sample size effect, the spreads are statistically and economically important. Also
interestingly, the stocks predicted to produce a weaker size effect do not generate a
statistically significant effect. The BM effect is 0.246 % (IS) or 0.182 % (OOS) per
month more positive among stocks that are predicted to produce a stronger BM effect
(lev) than among those predicted to produce a weaker effect (no lev, Panel B). Given
a 0.381 %-full sample BM effect, the spreads are also statistically and economically
important. Despite this, the stocks predicted to produce a weak BM effect still produce
a statistically significant effect. Neither the spreads in the size effect nor those in the
BM effect can be explained by the CAPM or the FFC model. To see this, note that the
samples producing stronger or weaker size and BM effects generate virtually identical
CAPM or FFC risk exposures.
Surprisingly, the momentum effect is 0.259 % (IS) or 0.079 % (OOS) per month
weaker among stocks predicted to produce a stronger effect than among those pre-
dicted to produce a weaker. Thus, we conclude that the previously found relationships
between the firm characteristics and the propensity of becoming a momentum driver
are not very stable (Panel C).
Next, we turn to the question of which firm characteristics are responsible for our
success in conditioning the size andBMeffects. In doing so,we repeat the above analy-
sis, this time, however, using different sets of LOGIT model-fitted values. To create
these sets, we sort the firm characteristics into six mutually exclusive categories. The
first set contains the risk exposures (SysRisk), the second the idiosyncratic volatility
proxy (IVol), and the third the variables proxying for financial distress (DefRisk).
The fourth set contains the variables proxying for share illiquidity (Illiq), the fifth the
dummy variable signaling a share price below one dollar (Micro), and the sixth the
analyst coverage-proxy (Uncertainty).18 For each set, we start with the slope coeffi-
cients obtained from the IS LOGIT- (see Table 5) or OOS LOGIT-models featuring
all firm characteristics and anomaly variables. We then create the new IS and OOS
LOGIT model-fitted values by setting the slope coefficients on all variables except
those on the variables in the set equal to zero. The advantage of this strategy is that
it allows us to analyze the ability of a specific set of firm characteristics to condition
the size and BM effects while still controlling for correlation between these variables
and those contained in other sets.
Table 7 shows the spreads in the anomaly effects across the sample of stocks that are
expected to produce a strong effect according to one of the six sets of firm character-
istics and the sample of stocks that are expected to produce a weak effect according to
17 They are not identical to the estimates in Table 3 because the current tests exclude stocks with incomplete
data for the firm characteristics.
18 More details about which exogenous variables belong to which set are in the caption of Table 7.
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Table 7 Spreads in the characteristic effects and the firm characteristics
Spreads in characteristic effect induced through
SysRisk IVol DefRisk Illiq Micro Uncertainty
Panel A: Size
In-sample
Both 0.019 −0.101*** −0.057*** 0.057*** −0.030* −0.087***
Long 0.014 −0.068*** −0.042*** 0.067*** −0.013 −0.064***
Short 0.003 −0.031*** −0.013** −0.038** −0.007 −0.025**
Out-of-sample
Both −0.023 −0.101*** −0.038* 0.097*** −0.014 0.022
Long −0.022 −0.068*** −0.027* 0.072*** −0.029*** 0.042***
Short 0.003 −0.031*** −0.009 0.002 −0.007 −0.022*
Panel B: Book-to-market
In-sample
Both 0.058 0.140*** 0.121** −0.074 0.032 0.175***
Long 0.023 0.050 0.040 −0.068* 0.006 0.078***
Short 0.027 0.060 0.056 0.010 0.042 0.050
Out-of-sample
Both 0.042 0.140*** −0.014 0.071 0.032 −0.034
Long 0.027 0.050 0.079** 0.029 0.003 −0.064*
Short 0.006 0.060 −0.099** 0.031 0.041 0.039
Panel C: Momentum
In-sample
Both −0.151 −0.149 −0.066 −0.132 −0.049 0.113
Long 0.121 −0.040 0.086 0.006 0.058 0.159
Short −0.185 −0.088 −0.102 −0.125 −0.055 −0.025
Out-of-sample
Both −0.123 −0.369 0.006 −0.117 0.233 −0.008
Long 0.046 −0.176 −0.003 −0.043 −0.204 0.088
Short −0.095 −0.091 0.015 −0.068 0.124 −0.107
The table shows the spreads in the size (Panel A), BM (Panel B), and momentum (Panel C) effects across a
sample containing all stocks except those in decile one and ten (both), ten (long), or one (short) predicted to
be non-anomaly drivers and a sample containing all stocks except those in characteristic deciles one and ten,
ten, or one predicted to be anomaly drivers. The spreads are per month. The stocks predicted to be anomaly
drivers are those whose fitted values from the LOGIT estimation in Eq. (4) are above the cross-sectional
median fitted value at the start of the investment period; the stocks predicted to be non-anomaly drivers
are those whose fitted values are below the cross-sectional median fitted value. The LOGIT model-fitted
values are obtained from either in-sample (IS) or recursive out-of-sample (OOS) estimations. In creating the
fitted values, we set all slope coefficient estimates—except those on the firm characteristics in the indicated
set—equal to zero. We focus on the following sets of firm characteristics: (i) Systematic risk (SysRisk):
the MKT-, SMB-, HML- and WML betas; (ii) Idiosyncratic risk (IVol): IVOL(FFC); (iii) Default risk
(DefRisk): ROA, DIVY and DEFR; (iv) Share illiquidity (Illiq): ZERORET and ILLIQ; (v) Microstructure
issues (Micro): PRC; and (vi) Uncertainty (Uncertainty): ANALYST. The firm characteristics and anomaly
variables are measured at the start of the investment period (June of year t), and they are described in the
caption of Table 4. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate statistical significance at the 99, 95, and 90 % confidence
levels, respectively. The recursive estimations start with the period from June 1974 to June 1982, so that
reported parameter estimates are based on the July 1982 to December 2007-period
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the same set. The spreads are calculated by either extracting stocks from both extreme
deciles (“both”) or by only extracting stocks fromdecile one or ten (“long” and “short”,
respectively). Independent of whether we use the IS- or OOS-fitted values, idiosyn-
cratic volatility and distress risk have the greatest power to condition the size effect,
with these variables helping us to improve on both the long and short side of a spread
portfolio trying to exploit the anomaly (Panel A). In contrast, the share price and share
liquidity only allow us to improve on the long side, and analyst following only allows
us to improve on both sides in the IS (but not the OOS) tests.
Turning to the BM anomaly, idiosyncratic volatility, distress risk, and analyst cov-
erage have the greatest conditioning power in the IS-tests. However, of these variables,
only idiosyncratic volatility continues to successfully condition the BM anomaly in
the OOS tests. Finally, regarding the momentum anomaly, we again find no evidence
suggesting that any set of variables is successfully able to condition this anomaly,
either in the IS- or the OOS tests.
Our finding that volatility and distress risk are most capable of identifying those
stocks that drive the size anomaly, while volatility alone is most capable of identifying
those that drive the BM anomaly, further supports the behavioral theories for these two
anomalies. In addition, we find some mild evidence that market microstructure biases
partially cause the abnormal returns of the long size anomaly drivers. As before, we
find no evidence to suggest that either the neoclassical, behavioral, or biased-based
theories explain the momentum anomaly.
5.4 Post-holding period performance
We finally study whether the stocks attracting abnormally high or low returns over
the current investment period continue to do so in future periods. We do so because
it is often assumed that a stock’s risk characteristics change only slowly over time.
Thus, if the long anomaly drivers are systematically riskier than the matched non-
anomaly drivers, we would not only expect them to outperform the others in the
current investment period, but also in future periods. Similarly, if the short anomaly
drivers are systematically less risky than the matched non-anomaly drivers, we would
not only expect them to underperform the others in the current investment period, but
also in future periods. In contrast, if mispricing underlies the anomalies, the abnormal
performance would disappear over the near-term future if the anomaly represents
the correction of the mispricing—or it would reverse if the anomaly represents the
mispricing itself.
To study persistence in becoming an anomaly driver, Table 8 offers the results from
Chan et al.’s (2003) run test. The table shows the average proportion of stocks that
consistently rank among the top 25 or 50 % contributors to a characteristic anomaly
over an expanding number of investment periods (one to five), where the averaging is
done over all non-overlapping consecutive periods in our sample. We find that stocks
classified as anomaly drivers are slightly more likely than others to be classified as
anomaly drivers in future periods. The only exception are the 25 % top contributors
to the long side of the size effect. However, despite the fact that we can usually reject
the null hypothesis of no persistence, the deviations from the null hypothesis are so
small that they hardly matter from an economic perspective.
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Table 9 shows the post-holding period performance of the strongest 1 or 5 %
contributors to the size, BM, and momentum anomalies. We measure post-holding
period performance using annualized compounded return spreads between the anom-
aly drivers and the matched non-anomaly drivers over various post-holding periods
ranging from 3 months to 4 years. We find that the long (short) anomaly drivers ini-
tially continue to significantly outperform (underperform) the matched non-anomaly
drivers, especially when we adjust returns for other firm characteristic effects. How-
ever, starting from 1 year after the initial holding period, the performance of the
anomaly drivers and the non-anomaly drivers becomes undistinguishable from one
another. In fact, looking at the raw returns, there is some tendency for performance to
reverse over longer-term future horizons.
Overall, the above results are most consistent with the behavioral theories.
6 Summary and conclusion
We use a new methodology to conduct a comprehensive analysis of whether neoclas-
sical, behavioral, or bias-based theories are most capable of explaining the size, BM,
and momentum effects in stock returns. In the first step, we run a statistical leverage
analysis to identify those stocks that are most responsible for the characteristic anom-
alies. In the second step, we compare the identified anomaly drivers with matched
non-anomaly drivers along several firm characteristics that the theories predict to
forecast the anomaly drivers. The purpose of these comparisons is to determine which
theory is most consistent with the relationships between firm characteristics and the
propensities to become a long or short anomaly driver found in the data.
Our tests suggest that a high idiosyncratic volatility and a high distress risk are
the strongest indicators of stocks becoming long or short size anomaly drivers. In
contrast, a high idiosyncratic volatility alone is the best indicator of stocks becoming
long or short BM anomaly drivers. We also find some evidence suggesting that the
small size drivers suffer frommarketmicrostructure biases. In contrast, we find no firm
characteristics that consistently forecast the identity of the (long or short) momentum
anomaly drivers. Finally, we show that there is little persistence in a stock’s tendency
to become a long or short anomaly driver.
Taken together, our evidence is most consistent with behavioral theories for the
size and BM effects. In particular, the finding that both long and short anomaly drivers
are volatile, sometimes distressed stocks support the behavioral hypothesis that these
stocks are hard to arbitrage and thus mispriced. The low persistence in becoming an
anomaly driver suggests that the anomalies capture temporary (rather than persistent)
deviations from economic fundamentals.
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Appendix 1: Technical details of the statistical leverage analysis
Consider the OLS regression of R on X, where R is a [N × 1]-vector containing the
endogenous variable,X is a [N×(K +1)]-matrix containing one and the K exogenous
variables, and N is the number of observations. The [(K +1)×1]-vector of parameter
estimates generated by this regression is γˆ = (XTX)−1XTR. We are interested in how
excluding single or subsets of observations from the regression changes the parameter
vector γˆ . Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) show that excluding observation i leads
to the following change in γˆ :




(XTX)−1XTPXei = − 1
1 − hi (X
TX)−1XTi uˆi , (7)
where γˆ (i) are the estimates from the regression excluding observation i , ei is an
[N × 1] vector, with i th element equal to one and all other elements equal to zero,
PX = X(XTX)−1XT, and MX = I − PX . Moreover, hi denotes the i th diagonal
element of matrix PX , while uˆi is stock i’s residual from the full sample regression
on all observations.
It is straightforward to generalize Eq. (7) to the case in which we exclude more than
one observation from the regression. To do so, consider the following two regressions:
R = Xγ + u, (8)
R = Xγ () + Eα + u, (9)
where Eq. (8) is the full sample regression ofR onX, and u is its residual. Equation (9)
is the full sample regression of R on X and E, where E =
[
eθ1 | · · · |eθq
]
and eθ j is
a [N × 1] vector with θ j th element equal to one and all others equal to zero. γ () and
α are the [(K + 1)× 1] and [q × 1] parameter vectors of this regression, respectively,
and u is its residual. Because of the dummy variables in E, the parameter vector
γ () is equivalent to the parameter vector from the regression of R on X excluding
the observations in  = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θq}.
Pre-multiplying Eq. (9) by PX = X(XTX)−1XT gives:
PX R = PX X γˆ () + PX Eαˆ + PX uˆ, (10)
or, equivalently:
X γˆ = X γˆ () + PX Eαˆ, (11)
where we use the facts that the parameter estimate, γˆ , is (XTX)−1XTR and that the
residual uˆ is orthogonal to the other exogenous variables. Solving Eq. (11) for the
difference between the two parameter estimate vectors, (γˆ () − γˆ ), gives:
γˆ () − γˆ = −(XTX)−1XTEαˆ, (12)
where we use the fact that XTPX = XT.
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Following from the Frisch–Waugh–Lovell theorem, the α estimate can be obtained
from the following regression:
MX R = MX Eα + r, (13)
where r is the residual of this regression. Using the closed-form solution for the
estimate, the estimate of the parameter vector α is:
αˆ = (ETMTX MX E)−1(ETMTX MX R) (14)
= (ETMX E)−1(ETuˆ) (15)
Substituting Eq. (15) into Eq. (12) gives:
γˆ () − γˆ = −(XTX)−1XTE(ETMX E)−1ETuˆ. (16)
Equation (16) allows us to calculate the statistical leverage of a set of observa-
tions. For example, assume that we want to exclude observations 5, 101, 743, and
3201 from the regression of R on X. Then q = 4,  = {5, 101, 743, 3201}, and
E = [e5|e101|e743|e3201]. Plugging E, the exogenous variable matrix X , and the
full sample residual uˆ into Eq. (16), we are able to determine the statistical leverage
from excluding these four observations.
Using Eq. (16) to identify the set of q observations that most strongly contribute
to the parameter estimate vector poses the problem that the number of candidate




, easily a very large number. Fortunately, we now show
that, as the total number of observations increases relative to the number of excluded
observations, the γˆ () − γˆ obtained from jointly excluding the observations in 
converges to the sum over the γˆ (i) − γˆ obtained from individually excluding the same
observations. Thus, when we exclude a relatively small number of observations, the
observations producing the largest joint statistical leverage are also those that have the
largest individual statistical leverage.
To prove the above claim, write out γˆ (θ j ) − γˆ :





























1−hθ j ,θ j
uθ j Xθ j ,1
1−hθ j ,θ j
. . .
uθ j Xθ j ,K
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where Xn,K indicates the nth observation of the kth exogenous variable and hi, j is
the row i , column j element of the matrix PX = X(XTX)−1XT. Denoting the row i ,
column j element of the first right-hand side matrix by δi, j , the (k + 1)th element of
(γˆ (θ j ) − γˆ ) is:
γˆ
(θ j )




uθ j Xθ j ,i−1
1 − hθ j ,θ j
, (18)
where Xθ j ,0 ≡ 1.
Writing out (γˆ () − γˆ ), we obtain:
γˆ () − γˆ = −(XTX)−1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 · · · 1

















1 − hθ1,θ1 −hθ1,θ2 · · · −hθ1,θq
























Denoting the row i , column j element of the first right-hand side matrix by δi, j and
assuming that the off-diagonal elements of MX are zero, we obtain:
γˆ () − γˆ = −
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
δ1,1 δ1,2 · · · δ1,K+1

































The (k + 1)th element of (γˆ () − γˆ ) is then given by:
γˆ
()






uθ j Xθ j ,i−1









uθ j Xθ j ,i−1




where again Xθ j ,0 ≡ 1.
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the off-diagonal elements of MX are zero. In the univariate case (i.e., when X contains
a constant and one regressor), an arbitrary off-diagonal element of MX is:
− hei,ej = −
∑N
n=1 X2n + (Xei + Xej )
∑N
n=1 Xn − N Xei Xej
N
∑N








n=1 X2n + (Xei + Xej ) 1N
∑N
n=1 Xn − Xei Xej
N ( 1N
∑N






−X2 + (Xei + Xej )X − Xei Xej
ˆvar(X) , (24)
where X is the sample mean of X , X2 is sample mean of X2, and ˆvar(X) is the
sample variance of X . Under standard assumptions, the sample mean and variance
converge to constants as the number of observations increases to infinity. Thus, hei,ej





k+1 − γˆk+1. While more tedious, we can prove a similar result when there is
more than one regressor in X .
Appendix 2: Derivation of the run test statistic
We now derive the asymptotic distribution of Chan et al.’s (2003) run test. Assume
there are a total of Nt firms in each time period t and a total of T time periods.
We denote by γ (i, t) the value of a specific firm characteristic for firm i . Define a
new random variable x(i, t) equal to one if the firm characteristic value is above the
(1 − p)th percentile in period t and else zero:
x(i, t) =
{
1, if γ (i, t) > perc1−p(γ (i, t))
0, else,
(25)
where perc1−p(γ (i, t)) is the (1 − p)th percentile of γ (i, t) constructed from the Nt
firms. Under the null hypothesis that each firm is equally likely to lie above the break-
point, the random variable x(i, t) follows a simple discrete probability distribution
given by:
Prob(x(i, t) = 1) = p and Prob(x(i, t) = 0) = 1 − p. (26)
Now define another random variable y(i, t∗, T ∗):
y(i, t∗, T ∗) =
T ∗∏
t=t∗
x(i, t), with t∗ ∈ {1, . . . , T − l + 1}, (27)
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where y(i, t∗, T ∗) is equal to one if x(n, t) is equal to one in each time period between
t∗ and T ∗, T ∗ is defined as t∗ + l − 1, and l is the length of the test period. Under the
null hypothesis of no persistence, the expected value of y(i, t∗, T ∗) is given by pl and
its variance is given by pl(1 − pl). The cross-sectional mean of y(i, t∗, T ∗) is given
by:




y(i, t∗, T ∗). (28)
The cross-sectional mean can be interpreted as the proportion of stocks whose firm
characteristic value is consistently above the (1 − p)th percentile during the t∗ to
T ∗-time period.19






2 z(t∗, T ∗) = (Nt∗,T ∗)− 12
Nt∗,T∗∑
i=1
(y(i, t∗, T ∗) − pl). (29)
Because each summand has an expectation of zero and the summands are only weakly






















We can rewrite the variance of
∑Nt∗,T∗
i=1 (y(i, t∗, T ∗) − pl) as:
Nt∗,T∗∑
i=1
Var(y(i, t∗, T ∗) − pl) +
∑
i = j
Cov(y(i, t∗, T ∗) − pl , y( j, t∗, T ∗) − pl).
(31)
Each variance terms equals pl(1− pl). We can write one of the covariance terms as:
Cov(y(i, t∗, T ∗)− pl , y( j, t∗, T ∗) − pl)=E[(y(i, t∗, T ∗) − pl)(y( j, t∗, T ∗)− pl)]
(32)
=E[y(i, t∗, T ∗) · y( j, t∗, T ∗)] − p2l . (33)
19 If l = 1, then y¯(t∗, T ∗) is not a random variable, as exactly p percent of its underlying values are equal
to unity.
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The expected value of y(i, t∗, T ∗) · y( j, t∗, T ∗) is given by:
E[y(i, t∗, T ∗) · y( j, t∗, T ∗)] (34)
= E[y(i, t∗, T ∗)E[y( j, t∗, T ∗)|y(i, t∗, T ∗)]] (35)
= (1 − p)l · 0 · E[y( j, t∗, T ∗)|y(i, t∗, T ∗) = 0]
+ pl · 1 · E[y( j, t∗, T ∗)|y(i, t∗, T ∗) = 1] (36)
= plE[y( j, t∗, T ∗)|y(i, t∗, T ∗) = 1] (37)
= pl(Prob {y( j, t∗, T ∗) = 1|y(i, t∗, T ∗) = 1} · 1
+Prob {y( j, t∗, T ∗) = 0|y(i, t∗, T ∗) = 1} · 0) (38)
= plProb {y( j, t∗, T ∗) = 1|y(i, t∗, T ∗) = 1} . (39)
The conditional probability in the last equality can be rewritten as:
Prob
{
y( j, t∗, T ∗) = 1|y(i, t∗, T ∗) = 1} (40)
= Prob{(x( j, t∗) = 1 ∧ · · · ∧ x( j, T ∗) = 1)|(x(i, t∗) = 1 ∧ · · · ∧ x(i, T ∗) = 1)}
(41)
= Prob {x( j, t∗) = 1|x(i, t∗) = 1} · · · · · Prob {x( j, T ∗) = 1|x(i, T ∗) = 1} (42)
=
(
Nt∗,T ∗ p − 1
Nt∗,T ∗ − 1
)l
, (43)
where the second equality follows from the facts that the x( j, t) are independent and
that the only relevant information in y(i, t, T ) = 1 for estimating the probability of
x( j, t, T ) = 1 is that x(i, t, T ) = 1. The third equality follows because there are a
total of Nt∗,T ∗ firms of which Nt∗,T ∗ × p produce a firm characteristic value above
the (1 − p)th percentile. If firm i has a firm characteristic value above the (1 − p)th
percentile, only (Nt∗,T ∗ · p − 1) of the other (Nt∗,T ∗ − 1) firms can have one too,






Because there are a total of Nt∗,T ∗ identical variance terms and a total of
Nt∗,T ∗(Nt∗,T ∗ − 1) identical covariance terms, the variance of the sum in Eq. (31)
is given by:
Nt∗,T ∗ p




Nt∗,T ∗ p − 1





implying that the variance of the test statistic z(t∗, T ∗) is:
Var(z(t∗, T ∗))= 1
Nt∗,T ∗
(




Nt∗,T ∗ p − 1
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Computing the cross-sectional mean y¯(t∗, T ∗) over several non-overlapping periods,
each containing l periods, the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean is nor-
mally distributed, with expected value equal to pl and variance equal to the value
given by Eq. (45) divided by the number of non-overlapping periods.
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